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THE RELEVANCE RATIO: EVALUATING THE
PROBATIVE VALUE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
IN CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES
Thomas D. Lyont &Jonathanj. Koehlertt
I
INTRODUCTION
It is hard to overstate the importance of expert testimony in
American courtrooms. Much of this testimony concerns scientific
matters that are beyond the ken of ordinary experience. In cases
where scientific matters play a central role, jurors may give substantial
weight to expert testimony or even treat it as dispositive. Standards
pertaining to the admissibility of scientific testimony are critical to the
outcome in many trials.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the United States
Supreme Court adopted a new standard for the admissibility of expert
scientific testimony.' Under Dauber, courts must independently assess
the scientific validity of an expert's methodology. The Court explicitly
rejected the Frye rule, under which courts based the admissibility of
expert testimony entirely on whether the expert's methodology had
achieved general acceptance in the relevant scientific community.2
Whether a technique is "generally accepted" is now only one consider-
ation in a multi-pronged analysis, which includes the falsifiability of
the expert's theory and the scientific technique's rate of error.3
Daubert could not have come at a better time. In recent years,
critics have attacked expert testimony in many areas as 'Junk science"4
t" Thomas D. Lyon (J.D. 1987, Harvard Law School, Ph.D. 1994, Stanford University,
Department of Psychology) is Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Southern Cali-
fornia Law School (University Park, Los Angeles, CA 90089-0071, e-mail:
tlyon@law.usc.edu).
"#" Jonathan J. Koehler (Ph.D. 1989, University of Chicago, Department of Behavioral
Sciences) is Associate Professor of Behavioral Decision Making in the Business and Law
Schools at the University of Texas at Austin (CBA 5.202, Austin, TX 78712, e-mail:
koehler@mail.utexas.edu).
1 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
2 Frye v. United States, 293 F.2d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
3 See Daubert 509 U.S. at 593-94. The inquiry also includes a consideration of
whether the theory has been subject to peer review and publication, and whether stan-
dards exist by which to evaluate the proffered technique. Id.
4 See, e.g., PETER W. HUBER, GAULEO's REvENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM
(1991).
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or, less colorfully, as lacking rigorous empirical support.5 Some of the
harshest criticism has been reserved for expert psychological and psy-
chiatric testimony in cases involving allegations of child sexual abuse. 6
Some commentators have argued that much of what passes for scien-
tific knowledge in this field is more impressionistic and anecdotal
than scientific.7 Daubert mandates that trial courts take these criti-
cisms seriously. Courts must not only demand that experts provide
empirical support for their claims, but they must also evaluate the sci-
entific merits of the available data before making admissibility
decisions. 8
Whether trial judges are capable of performing like "amateur
scientists"9 is questionable. What makes a test falsifiable?' ° What is
5 See generally Charles P. Ewing, "Dr. Death" and the Case for an Ethical Ban on Psychiatric
and Psychological Predictions of Dangerousness in Capital Sentencing Proceedings, 8 AM. J.L. &
MED. 407, 417-18 (1983) (arguing that predictions of dangerousness "cannot be said to be
founded on a scientific basis"); Michael J. Saks &JonathanJ. Koehler, What DNA "Finger-
printing" Can Teach the Law About the Rest of Forensic Science, 13 CARuozo L REv. 361, 372
(1991) ("[M]ost forensic sciences, including DNA typing, rely on assumptions that have
not yet been verified by empirical testing."); David L. Faigman, Note, The Battered Woman
Syndrome and Self-defense: A Legal and Empirical Dissen4 72 VA. L. RExv. 619 (1986) (criticizing
the quality of research on battered woman syndrome and arguing that courts should not
admit expert testimony based on this research).
6 See generally RonaldJ. Allen &Joseph S. Miller, The Expert as Educator: Enhancing the
Rationality of Verdicts in Child Sex Abuse Prosecutions, 1 PSYCHOL, PUB. POL'Y, & L. 323 (1995)
(promoting expert testimony only as a means of educating jurors); Lisa R. Askowitz &
Michael H. Graham, The Reliability of Expert Psychological Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Prose-
cutions, 15 CARDozo L. REV. 2027 (1994) (urging courts to take a more active role in scruti-
nizing expert psychological testimony before admitting it in child abuse prosecutions);
Robert J. Levy, Using "Scientific" Testimony to Prove Child Sexual Abuse, 23 FAM. L.Q. 388
(1989) (concluding that mental health professionals' testimony about evaluative tech-
niques that are unscientific and deceptive jeopardizes the fairness of factual findings);
Mary Ann Mason, The Child Sex Abuse Syndrome: The Other Major Issue in State of NewJersey
v. Margaret Kelly Michaels, 1 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y, & L. 399 (1995) (supporting a closer
examination of scientific reliability in child abuse cases); David McCord, Expert Psychological
Testimony About Child Complainants in Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: A Foray into the Admissibility of
Novel Psychological Evidenc, 77J. ClM. L. & CRiMrNOLOGY 1, 6 (1986) (noting "a woeful lack
of serious review of the existing behavioral scientific research [on child abuse) by the
courts"); Andrew Cohen, Note, The Unreliability of Expert Testimony on the Typical Characteris-
tics of Sexual Abuse Victims, 74 GEO. LJ. 429 (1985) (advocating the admission of expert
testimony on behalf of sexual abuse victims only in unusual cases because such testimony
often misleads ajury).
7 See, e.g., Mason, supra note 6, at 402 (asserting that current research does not sup-
port clinicians' claims that there are clear behavioral indicators of sexual abuse).
8 DauberA 509 U.S. at 592-93 (holding that Rule 104(a) requires federal judges to
make a "preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the
testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can
be applied to the facts in issue").
9 ChiefJustice Rehnquist used this term in Daubert, 509 U.S. at 601 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
10 As Chief Justice Rehnquist complained, "I defer to no one in my confidence in
federal judges; but I am at a loss to know what is meant when it is said that the scientific
status of a theory depends on its 'falsifiability,' and I suspect some of them will be, too." Id.
at 600 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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meant by a technique's "rate of error"?" How much error is tolera-
ble? The tests outlined in Daubert are worded as "general observa-
tions,"12 rather than specific tools for assessing the scientific validity or
the probative value of proffered testimony.' 3
Our paper addresses this problem. We feel strongly that the ad-
missibility of scientific expert testimony should turn on its scientific
merit. However, we also sympathize with the difficulties that trial
courts face when trying to think like scientists. As a first step toward
solving this dilemma, courts can make major advances in the treat-
ment of proffered scientific testimony by recasting certain traditional
legal concepts in scientifically appropriate ways.
One important legal concept is relevance. All evidence must be
relevant to be admissible. 14 This Article offers a rigorous definition of
relevance that courts can use to evaluate the probative value of prof-
fered scientific testimony. We introduce what we call the relevance
ratio-a simple formula that is based on the legal definition of rele-
vant evidence and on probability theory. Evenjudges and others who
have little background in science or mathematics may use the rele-
vance ratio profitably. We apply this ratio in the context of expert
testimony in child sexual abuse cases. In doing so, we examine how
the admissibility decision would be better informed if courts used the
relevance ratio. The ratio is equally useful for assessing the relevance
of expert testimony in other fields.
Part II defines the relevance ratio and explains its relation to
probabilistic reasoning. Part Ill uses the ratio to explore the ways in
which physicians have misused the term "consistent with sexual abuse"
in child abuse cases. Part IV considers whether symptoms "consistent
with sexual abuse," although irrelevant for the purpose of proving
abuse, may nevertheless be admissible for rebutting the assertion that
abuse did not occur. Part V uses the relevance ratio to show that
symptoms that are common among abused children may nonetheless
have little if any relevance for proving that abuse occurred. Part VI
discusses the relevance of clusters of symptoms and reveals ways in
which clusters are likely to be less relevant than often believed. Part
VII outlines the methodological limitations of existing research on the
11 See, e.g., infra notes 62-69 and accompanying text (misconceptions about the "rate
of error").
12 Dauber 509 U.S. at 593.
1S See Margaret A. Berger, Procedural Paradigms for Applying the Daubert Test, 78 MiNN.
L. REv. 1345, 1345 (1994).
14 In this paper, we use "relevance" to refer to logical relevance. Although Daubert
discusses relevance, it does so in terms of "fit," which is analogous to materiality and con-
cerns the extent to which the expert testimony is "tied to the facts of the case." Daubert,
509 U.S. at 591 (quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3rd Cir. 1985)).
We do not address the issue of "fit" in this Article.
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symptoms of child sexual abuse and explains why they may lead to
poor estimates of the relevance ratio. Part VIII uses the relevance ra-
tio to demonstrate that probative asymmetries exist between the pres-
ence and absence of various symptoms. Part IX discusses the
significance of the existence of symptoms among nonabused children
for understanding the significance of those symptoms among abused
children.
II
THE RELEVANCE RATIO
Federal Rule of Evidence 401 defines "relevant evidence" as evi-
dence that has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is
of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence."15 In a child
abuse case, evidence that a child suffered a particular symptom is rele-
vant for proving abuse if the presence of the symptom increases the
chance that abuse actually occurred. One can determine whether the
presence of symptoms increases the chance that abuse occurred by
considering two proportions: the proportion of abuse cases in which
the symptom occurs, and the proportion of nonabuse cases in which
the symptom occurs. If the proportion of abuse cases exhibiting the
symptom is greater than the proportion of nonabuse cases exhibiting
the symptom, then the symptom is relevant for proving that abuse oc-
curred. 16 We refer to this ratio of proportions as the "relevance ratio"
and offer this ratio as the appropriate standard against which to mea-
sure the relevance of expert testimony. 17
15 See FED. R. EvD. 401; see also CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK,
MODERN EVIDENCE § 1.2, at 4 n.2 (1995) (noting that as of 1994, 35 states have adopted
rules of evidence similar to the Federal Rules).
16 Cf. Richard 0. Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L REv. 1021, 1026 (1977)
("[E]vidence is logically relevant only when the probability of finding that evidence given
the truth of some hypothesis at issue in the case differs from the probability of finding the
same evidence given the falsity of the hypothesis at issue"). The logarithm of the relevance
ratio (i.e., Bayes's "likelihood ratio") provides an equivalent measure of relevance. This
method is advantageous, because it equates the relevance of evidence offered by both the
plaintiff and the defendant. See David H. Kaye, Comment, Quantijfing Probative Value, 66
B.U. L. Rxv. 761, 765 (1986) ("[E]vidence is relevant as that term is used in Rule 401 if its
log-likelihood ratio is not zero."); see also Ward Edwards, Comment, 66 B.U. L. REv. 623,
626 (1986) (noting a log-likelihood ratio's properties of symmetry and additivity, qualities
that other measures lack). Although we agree with Kaye and Edwards that the log-likeli-
hood ratio has some desirable mathematical properties, we believe that the simplicity and
intuitive appeal of the relevance ratio make it the better candidate for heuristic use by
judges. Moreover, as Kaye points out, one can maintain the mathematical symmetry be-
tween the relevance ratio for the plaintiff's evidence and the relevance ratio for the defen-
dant's evidence by simply inverting the relevance ratio when considering the defendant's
evidence. Kaye, supra, at 763 n.12.
17 See infrafig.1.
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For example, suppose a prosecutor wishes to introduce expert
psychological testimony that a particular child suffered from low self-
esteem to support his contention that the child was abused. Is low
self-esteem relevant for proving abuse? Even if data are available
which indicate that many abused children suffer from low self-es-
teem,' 8 it may also be true that many nonabused children suffer from
low self-esteem. Neither fact in isolation indicates whether low self-
esteem is relevant for proving abuse. However, a ratio of the relevant
proportions answers this question. If a higher percentage of abused
children exhibit low self-esteem than nonabused children, then this
symptom is relevant for proving that abuse has occurred. Many stud-
ies have examined self-esteem in these two populations and differ-
ences have not been detected consistently.19 Thus, the relevance ratio
for low self-esteem appears to be near unity, and one may conclude
that this symptom fails a relevance test.
This simple example illustrates the intuition that a symptom is
less probative if one commonly observes the symptom among
nonabused children. However, as will be discussed shortly, conclu-
sions reached through intuitive appraisals often differ from those
reached using a relevance ratio analysis. In our view, a relevance ratio
analysis is the most efficient way to think about evidentiary relevance.20 In
cases of alleged child abuse, one cannot establish the relevance of a
symptom or cluster of symptoms merely by confirming that the symp-
tom commonly occurs in abused children. Likewise, dismissing a
proffered symptom because the symptom appears in some nonabused
children is inappropriate. Relevance is best determined by comparing
the relevant proportion in both the abused and nonabused
population.
18 See Angela Browne & David Finkelhor, Initial and Long-term Effects: A Review of the
Research, in A SouRcEBooK ON CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 143, 150 (David Finkelhor et al. eds.,
1986) (citing a study in which 58% of sexual abuse victims expressed feelings of inferiority
or lack of self-worth).
19 See Kathleen A. Kendall-Tackett et al., Impact of Sexual Abuse on Children: A Review
and Synthesis of Recent Empirical Studies, 113 PSYCHOL. BULL. 164, 165 (1993) (noting that
half of the studies comparing self-esteem between abused and nonabused children found
no difference).
20 But see Richard D. Friedman, A Close Look at Probative Value, 66 B.U. L. REv. 733
(1986) [hereinafter Friedman, A Close Look]; Richard D. Friedman, Conditional Probative
Value: Neocassicism Without Myth, 93 MICH. L. REv. 439, 456-57 (1994). Friedman proposes
a measure of probative value that examines the difference between one's beliefs before
and after the introduction of evidence. Friedman, A Close Look, supra, at 738. David Kaye
criticizes Friedman's measure for including the strength of one's pre-existing belief in the
determinations of the relevance of evidence subsequently received. Kaye, supra note 16, at
765-66. But Kaye admits, "There may be more than one right answer to the questions of
measuring the probative value of evidence." Id. at 766. We agree, but maintain that pro-
posals relying on pre-existing beliefs are questionable for reasons outlined in Kaye, supra
note 16, and Edwards, supra note 16.
19961
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82:43
Readers familiar with the literature on probabilistic reasoning in
the law may recognize the relevance ratio as the likelihood ratio term
from Bayes's Theorem. Bayes's Theorem provides a method for up-
dating probabilistic beliefs in the face of new evidence.21 It combines
a likelihood ratio (which captures the diagnostic value of new evi-
dence) with a prior odds ratio (which captures one's initial beliefs
about the hypothesis) to form a posterior odds ratio (post-evidentiary
belief about the hypothesis).22
The applicability of Bayes's Theorem to legal decision-making
has been a source of controversy for at least twenty-five years.23 But,
21 MICHAEL 0. FINKELSrEIN & BRUCE LEVIN, STATISTICS FOR LAWYERS 92-94 (1990).
22 See id. The odds form of Bayes's Theorem provides a normatively justifiable mecha-
nism for updating one's beliefs in the face of new evidence. For some Hypothesis H and
Evidence E,
P(HI E) P(H) P(E IH)
P(H-E) - (H)x P(EIH)
In other words, the posterior odds ratio
P(H E)
P(H IE)
is the product of the prior odds ratio
P(H)
P(H)
and the likelihood ratio
P(E IH)
P(E H)
See David H. Kaye, Introduction: What is Bayesianism?, in PROBA3ILIY AND INFERENCE IN THE
LAW OF EVIDENCE 1, 9 (Peter Tillers & Eric D. Green eds., 1988).
23 See, e.g., Jonathan J. Koehler, Probabilities in the Courtroom: An Evaluation of the Objec-
tions and Policies, in HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LAw 167 (D.K. Kagehiro & W.S. Laufer
eds., 1992); Jonathan J. Koehler, The Normative Status of Base Rates at Trial, in INDIvIDUAL
AN GROUP DECISION MAMNG 137 (N.John Castellan,Jr. ed., 1993); RonaldJ. Allen, On the
Significance of Batting Averages and Strikeout Totals: A Clarification of the "Naked Statistical Evi-
dence"Debate, the Meaning of "Evidence," and the Requirement of Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt,
65 TUL. L. REv. 1093 (1991); Lea Brilmayer & Lewis Kornhauser, Review: Quantitative Meth-
ods and Legal Decisions, 46 U. CI. L REV. 116 (1978); Craig P. Callen, Adjudication and the
Appearance of Statistical Evidence, 65 TuL. L REv. 457 (1991); Craig R. Callen, Cognitive Sci-
ence and the Sufficiency of "Sufficiency of the Evidence" Tests, 65 TuL. L. REv. 1113 (1991); Craig
R. Callen, Notes on a Grand illusion: Some Limits on the Use of Bayesian Theory in Evidence Law,
57 IND. L.J. 1 (1982); Michael 0. Finkelstein & William B. Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to
Identflcation Evidene, 83 HARv. L. REV. 489 (1970); Randolf N.Jonakait, When Blood is Their
Argument: Probabilities in Criminal Cases, Genetic Markers, and, Once Again, Bayes' Theorem,
1983 U. ILL. L REV. 369;John Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Facqflnding Process, 20 STAN. L
REv. 1065 (1968); David Kaye, The Paradox of the Gatecrasher and Other Stories, 1979 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 101; D.H. Kaye, Apples and Oranges: Confidence Coefflcients and the Burden of Persuasion, 73
CORNELL L. REv. 54 (1987);JonathanJ. Koehler, The Probity/Policy Distinction in the Statistical
EvidenceDebate, 66 TUL. L. REv. 141 (1991);JonathanJ. Koehler & Daniel N. Shaviro, Veridi-
cal Verdicts: Increasing Verdict Accuracy Through the Use of Overtly Probabilistic Evidence and Meth-
ods, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 247 (1990); Lempert, supra note 16; Charles Nesson, The Evidence
or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1357 (1985);
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whereas much of the debate has concerned the feasibility of identify-
ing prior probabilities, our analysis focuses on the likelihood ratio.
We rely on the research on probative value that points to the likeli-
hood ratio as the most reasonable way of representing relevance 24 and
maintain that judges should use that function when deciding whether
to admit scientific evidence. Professor David Kaye is correct that a
likelihood-based approach to relevance or probative value "can be em-
braced without a commitment to Bayesian reasoning."2 5 We pursue
this perspective vigorously. A consideration of whether Bayes's Theo-
rem should be introduced at trial or whether the trier of fact should
be encouraged to use probabilistic combination rules is, therefore,
unnecessary. Moreover, to free the likelihood-based approach from
its Bayesian baggage and to make the relevance concept more intui-
tive and less linguistically confusing, we introduce the term "relevance
ratio" to replace the term "likelihood ratio." We also dispense with
much of the mathematical notation which has discouraged even quan-
titatively minded jurists from applying the relevance ratio in a wider
range of cases.26
Relevance ratio reasoning is also unusual in the testimony pro-
vided by experts in psychology and medicine in cases of alleged child
abuse. As a result, the terms experts use to describe the frequency or
severity of symptoms often obscure the relevance of those symptoms.
Moreover, a failure to appreciate the need to consider the frequency
Charles R. Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and Permissive Inferences: The Value of Complexity, 92
HARv. L. REv. 1187 (1979); Michael J. Saks & R.F. Kidd, Human Information Processing and
Adjudication: Trial by Heuristics, 15 L & Soc'v REv. 123 (1980-81); Daniel Shaviro, A Response
to Professor Allen, 65 TUL. L. RPnv. 1111 (1991); Daniel Shaviro, A Response to Professor Callen,
65 TUL. L. REv. 499 (1991); Daniel Shaviro, Statistical-Probability Evidence and the Appearance
ofJustice, 103 HiARv. L. REv. 530 (1989); Symposium, Decision and Inference in Litigation, 13
CARDozo L. REv. 253 (1991); Symposium, Probability and Inference in the Law of Evidence 66
B.U. L. REv. 377 (1986); Lawrence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the
Legal Process, 84 1-Atv. L REv. 1329 (1971); Richard W. Wright, Causation, Responsibility,
Risk, Probability, Naked Statistics, and Proof. Pruning the Bramble Bush by Clarifying the Concepts,
73 Iowa L. REv. 1001 (1988).
24 See, e.g., Kaye, supra note 16; D.H. Kaye, The Relevance of Matching'DNA: Is the Wn-
dow Half Open or Half Shut, 85J. Cram. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 676, 683-86 (1995) [hereinafter
Kaye, The Relevance of Matching' DNA]; Lempert, supra note 16.
25 Kaye, The Relevance of Matching'DNA, supra note 24, at 678 n.11; see also United
States v. Shonubi, 895 F. Supp. 460, 485 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) ("It is possible to accept the valid-
ity of Bayes Theorem as a guide to ... decision-making, without attempting the complex
calculations literal application ... would require."), vacated, No. 116, 95-1249, 1997 WL
2540 (2d Cir. Jan. 6, 1997); Richard Lempert, The New Evidence Scholarship: Analyzing the
Process of Proof 66 B.U. L. REv. 439, 446 (1986) ("Bayes' Theorem may be useful as a heuris-
tic device.").
26 Judge Jack Weinstein (United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York) andJudge Frank Easterbrook (United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit) are two notable exceptions in an otherwise remarkably math-phobic population. See
Shonubi, 895 F. Supp. at 460; Branion v. Gramly, 855 F.2d 1256 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
490 U.S. 1008.
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of symptoms among nonabused children has led many courts and
commentators to misinterpret the significance of expert testimony in
abuse cases. In what follows, we identify the errors in reasoning attrib-
utable to this misunderstanding and explain how an awareness of the
relevance ratio can lead to better judgments.
FIGURE 1
The Relevance Ratio
Proportion of Abused Who Show Symptoms
Proportion of Nonabused Who Show Symptoms
The relevance ratio measures the relevance or probative value of evi-
dence. In cases of alleged abuse, symptoms associated with ratios
greater than one are relevant for proving abuse because they make
abuse more likely than it was prior to the introduction of the symptom
evidence. Symptoms associated with ratios at or near one are not rele-
vant for proving abuse because they do not change our judgment
about the likelihood that abuse occurred.
III
DoEs "CONSISTENT WITH" MEAN RELEvANT?
Physicians frequently testify that a child's physical condition is
"consistent with" sexual abuse.2 7 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
has asserted that "consistent with" is the "customary cautious profes-
sional jargon" for causation.28 Although some medical experts have
recommended that the term "consistent with" sexual abuse be limited
to cases in which the physical evidence is relevant for proving that
abuse occurred,29 a child's physical condition is often described as
"consistent with" abuse when the condition is merely concomitant
with abuse, but of questionable relevance.30
27 See infra notes 29-33. Experts also use the "consistent with" language when describ-
ing the behavior of children alleged to have been sexually abused. See, e.g., State v. Town-
send, 635 So. 2d 949, 958 (Fla. 1994) ("(A] medical expert witness may testify as to
whether, in the expert's opinion, the behavior of a child is consistent with the behavior of a
child who has been sexually abused.").
28 United States v. DeNoyer, 811 F.2d 436, 438 n.3 (8th Cir. 1987).
29 See, e.g., State v. Gribble, 804 P.2d 634, 637 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991) (noting that a
doctor testified that an attenuated hymen and enlarged vaginal opening were "consistent
with," but not absolutely diagnostic of sexual abuse); Jan Bays & David Chadwick, Medical
Diagnosis of the Sexually Abused Child 17 CHiLD ABUSE & NEGLECT 91, 106 (1993) (listing
conditions as "consistent with" sexual abuse that are evidence of abuse but not "diagnostic"
of abuse).
30 Doctors will testify that a condition is "consistent with" sexual abuse and also "con-
sistent with" other causes, but not make clear whether the condition is more common
among abused children or nonabused children. See, e.g., State v. Hollywood, 680 P.2d 655,
657 (Or. Ct. App. 1984) (referencing testimony that an "inflamed and irritated vagina and
[Vol. 82:43
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A relevance ratio analysis, however, reveals that a condition that is
"consistent with" abuse is relevant for proving that abuse occurred
only when the condition occurs more frequently among abused chil-
dren than among nonabused children. As it is commonly used, the
"consistent with" terminology does not require consideration of the
frequency with which the condition occurs among nonabused chil-
dren. Typically, the "consistent with" terminology is merely an obser-
vation that at least some abused children exhibit the condition. Thus,
"consistent with" testimony informs a factfinder that the numerator of
the relevance ratio is nonzero, but says nothing about the denomina-
tor. The numerator must be compared with the denominator, how-
ever, for the relevance of the condition to be fully understood.
Physicians testifying in sexual abuse cases have even labeled nor-
mal physical findings as "consistent with" sexual abuse. In Barnes v.
United States, a doctor testified that the lack of physical signs "was con-
sistent with nothing happening at all and with the child's [abuse]
story."31 In Randall v. State, a doctor testified that he found "some
opening of the hymenal ring, which could be normal for an 11-year-
old child."32 He went on to say, however, that this potentially normal
finding was "consistent with" abuse, because "some degree of penetra-
tion could occur without totally perforating the hymen."33 Thus,
although normal physical findings are not diagnostic of sexual abuse,
physicians often report that they are "consistent with" abuse. Physi-
cians reach this misleading conclusion because abuse often leaves no
outer vaginal lips" in a 4-year-old may be "consistent with sexual molestation" but that it is
also consistent with infection); In re Michelle I., 189 A.D.2d 998, 1000 (N.Y. App. Div.
1993) ("[A] pediatrician who examined the girls testified that both girls exhibited redness
in their labia and vulva regions, which was consistent with sexual abuse."); People v. Haun,
581 N.E.2d 864, 868 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (noting that a doctor stated that the "fact she
could easily insert her index finger into the victim's vagina... [was] consistent with sexual
abuse," but "would have also been consistent with the practice of masturbation"); In re
Nassau County Department of Social Services, 176 A.D.2d 881, 882 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991)
(discussing a witness who explained that a finding of "superficial vaginal injury" [was]
.consistent with the possibility of sexual abuse but... [was] also consistent with explana-
tions other than sexual abuse"); State v. Paster, 524 A.2d 587, 589 (RI. 1987) ("Doctor
Ettefagh's examination revealed anal fissures and what appeared to be an enlarged vaginal
opening. Doctor Ettef-agh testified that these findings are consistent with sexual abuse, but
that they could also result from other causes."). As noted below, redness of the genitalia
(erythema) is as common among nonabused children as among abused children. See infra
note 36.
31 600 A.2d 821, 823 (D.C. 1991).
32 428 S.E.2d 616, 620 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993).
33 Id.
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physical signs34 and because variations in the genitalia are often the
product of natural occurrences.3 5
Studies of sexual abuse that include a control sample (i.e., a
group of children who have not been abused) enable professionals to
estimate both components of the relevance ratio and thereby estimate
the relevance of various physical symptoms. This research shows that
some physical conditions that were once widely believed to be indica-
tive of sexual abuse are so common in nonabused children that they
have only limited relevance as proof of abuse. Redness of the genita-
lia (erythema) appears to be as common among nonabused children
as among abused children.3 6 Hymenal diameters among nonabused
girls range widely, suggesting that a slightly enlarged vaginal opening
is not relevant for proving abuse.37 Other physical findings, once
grounds for suspicion, are now considered normal.3 8 As the relevance
34 See, e.g., Bays & Chadwick, supra note 29, at 92 (noting that a review of 21 studies of
abused children found that "[n]ormal examinations were reported in 26% to 73% of girls
(mean 50%) and 17% to 82% (mean 53%) of boys").
35 See Abbey Berenson et al., Appearance of the Hymen in Newborns, 87 PEDIATRICS 458
(1991) (noting that physical examinations of the genitalia of 468 newborn girls showed
that lateral and ventral clefts, intravaginal and external ridges, and periurethral bands were
common.).
36 See, e.g., Bays & Chadwick, supra note 29 (arguing that erythema is common among
nonabused girls, and that erythema and perianal erythema are also unlikely to be due to
abuse.); S.Jean Emans et al., Genital Findings in Sexually Abused Symptomatic and Asymptomatic
Girls, 79 PEDATics 778 (1987) (studying 119 abused girls, 127 normal girls with no sexual
complaints, and 59 girls with genital complaints unrelated to sexual abuse and concluding
that erythema is not significantly more common among abused girls when controlled for
race);John McCann et al., Genital Findings in Prepubertal Girls SelectedforNonabuse: A Descrip-
tive Study, 86 PEDIATRICS 428, 432 tbl.3 (1990) [hereinafter McCann et al., Genital Findings]
(finding erythema in 56% of the 91 nonabused girls observed in supine position and in
34% of the 90 nonabused girls observed in the knee-chest position); John McCann et al.,
Perianal Findings in Prepubertal Children Selected for Nonabuse: A Descriptive Study, 13 CHILD
ABUSE & NEGLECr 179, 187 tbl.1 (1989) (finding erythema in 41% of the 168 nonabused
observed children).
37 SeeJoyce A. Adams, Classification of Anogenital Findings in Children with Suspected Sex-
ualAbuse: An Evolving Process, 6 AMERicAN PROF. SOC'Y ON THE ABUSE OF CHILDREN ADVISOR
11 (1993) (arguing that the hymenal opening may be cause for suspicion if a child has
hymenal opening more than two standard deviations above the mean for children of the
same age and examination position); Emans et al., supra note 36, at 784 ("Although the
differences in hymenal measurements between [abused and nonabused girls] are statisti-
cally significant, the ranges overlap and... are unlikely to be clinically useful unless the
hymen is dilated beyond the range of normal...."); McCann et al., Genital Findings, supra
note 36, at 433 ("The diameters of the hymenal orifice gradually increased with the age of
the child. Within each age group, the individual measurements fell along a typical bell-
shaped curve .... ").
38 See, e.g., Adams, supra note 37 (noting that normal findings include hymenal tags,
hymenal bumps or mounds, anal tags in the midiine, and increased perianal pigmenta-
tion); Abbey B. Berenson et al., Appearance of the Hymen in Prepubertal Girls, 89 PEDIATRICS
387, 394 (1992) ("Hymenal bumps, notches on the upper portion of the hymen between
the 9- and 3-o'clock positions, tags, vestibular bands, longitudinal intravaginal ridges, and
external ridges were all noted frequently enough in a pediatric population to be consid-
ered normal findings."); Bays & Chadwick, supra note 29, at 106 (referring to many of
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ratio shows, symptoms that are as likely to appear in nonabused chil-
dren as in abused children are not relevant for proving that abuse
occurred, although they are clearly "consistent with" abuse. Expert
testimony about the presence or absence of such symptoms is inappro-
priate and should be excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 401.
One might object that doctors should be able to testify to the
mere presence of physical symptoms "consistent with" abuse, even
when the symptoms are not probative of abuse, because doctors base
their diagnoses on both physical findings and the history taken from
the child. 9 However, when a doctor states that the physical findings
are "consistent with" abuse and then concludes that the child was
abused, a finder of fact may erroneously conclude that the physical
findings constitute independent evidence of abuse. As a result, the
physician's testimony inappropriately transforms the physical evi-
dence of uncertain relevance into corroboration for the abuse allega-
tion. 40 In response, one might argue that such confusion can be
clarified on cross-examination. This possibility exists, but the effect of
a doctor's admission that the findings are also "consistent with"
nonabuse may be lost on ajury, who could reasonably believe that the
doctor is testifying for the prosecution because he or she believes the
physical findings were caused by abuse.
Describing a child's normal condition as "consistent with" abuse
transforms a doctor's belief that a child is telling the truth about
these findings as "unlikely to be due to abuse"). These research findings raise the possibil-
ity that findings made in a number of cases were not in fact attributable to abuse. See
People v. Beauchamp, 143 A.D.2d 13, 20 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (Smith,J, dissenting) (The
doctor found "a skin tag or extra piece of skin at the anal opening" and "stated that skin
tags in the rectum without sexual abuse are rare."), af'd, 539 N.E.2d 1105 (N.Y. 1989); In
re TaniaJ., 147 A.D.3d 252, 254 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (citing a doctor's testimony that "the
anal tag and the synechia [adhesion between the hymenal ring and the labia minora]
could only have resulted from chronic digital or penile penetration"); Commonwealth v.
Sullivan, 538 A.2d 1363, 1365 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (noting that a doctor "testified that he
found a 'skin tag' in the child's rectal area which suggested a healed trauma consistent
with penile-rectal contact"). State v. Moore, 749 S.W.2d 601, 602 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988)
("[The doctor] found a 'bump' at the 5 o'clock position of the hymen which is consistent
with a non-accidental injury and also consistent with digital penetration of the hymen. The
'bump' is due to scar tissue forming after injury to the hymen.").
39 Indeed, research documenting the existence of various physical findings among
nonabused children frequently stresses that the ultimate determination whether abuse has
occurred must rely in large part on the statements of the child. See McCann et al., Genital
Findings, supra note 36, at 438; Bays & Chadwick, supra note 29, at 92. See also Sullivan, 538
A.2d at 1365 ("[The doctor] based his opinion that the child had been abused on a combi-
nation of social and psychological factors and said that his physical finding regarding the
'skin tag' was merely a small piece of supportive evidence.").
40 See In re Michelle I., 189 A.D.2d at 994 (holding that redness of the genitalia satis-
fies the requirement that hearsay be supported by "evidence tending to support the relia-
bility" of the child's statements); In re Alena D., 125 AD.2d 753 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986)
(same). As we discuss below, an irrelevant symptom does not become relevant when
paired with actual evidence of abuse. See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
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abuse into a medical opinion that the child was abused. Hence, what
would likely be excluded as an impermissible comment on the child's
credibility becomes an admissible expert opinion.41 Moreover, the
testimony about an irrelevant physical finding provides the doctor an
opportunity to repeat the child's statements in explaining his or her
conclusion that the child was abused. Use of the "consistent with"
terminology therefore enables doctors to repeat what might otherwise
be excluded as inadmissible hearsay.42
In sum, symptoms that are "consistent with" abuse are not neces-
sarily relevant for proving that abuse occurred. Whereas "consistent
with" commonly means that some abused children exhibit the symp-
tom, relevance requires a showing that more abused children exhibit
the symptom than nonabused children. Unless a proponent can
demonstrate relevance, "consistent with" testimony should be ex-
cluded, not only on Rule 401 grounds, but because whatever minimal
value it may have is outweighed by the possibility of unfair prejudice.
IV
ARE SYMPTOMS "CONSISTENT WITH" ABUSE RELEVANT
FOR REBUTTAL?
Although testimony that a child's symptoms are "consistent with"
abuse may not be relevant for proving that abuse occurred, "consis-
tent with" testimony may nevertheless rebut the assumption that the
child's condition is inconsistent with abuse. Recall that when a symp-
tom is "consistent with" abuse, at least some abused children exhibit
41 See State v. Wilson, 855 P.2d 657 (Or. Ct. App. 1993). In Wilson, the doctor's exami-
nation revealed no physical evidence of sexual abuse. Id. at 658. The defendant argued
that "because there was no physical evidence of abuse, the jury could infer from [Dr.] Bays'
diagnosis of sexual abuse that she believed the child, making that diagnosis an impermissi-
ble comment on the child's credibility." Id. The court rejected the defendant's argument,
noting that based on the child's interview evaluation, "physical examination and history, she
diagnosed the child as having been sexually abused. Although, if believed, Bays' testimony
supported the child's testimony, that does not render it a direct comment on the child's
credibility. It was an opinion as to the proper medical diagnosis." Id. at 660 (first emphasis
added). See also State v Butler, 349 S.E.2d 684 (Ga. 1986). In Butler, the court upheld the
admission of an examining physician's opinion that the child had been molested, since it
"was based on her physical examination of the child as well as on the history related to her
by the child." Id. at 685. Although the court emphasized the doctor's testimony that "the
hymen was not intact and.., the vaginal opening was larger than normal" and that "this
evidence was consistent with sexual abuse," id., the court of appeals noted that the doctor's
"diagnosis of the child's physical condition was 'essentially normal'...." Butler v. State,
342 S.E.2d 338, 339-340 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986). But see United States v. Whitted, 11 F.3d 782,
786 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that a doctor cannot express opinion that child was sexually
abused when physical findings not probative of abuse).
42 See, e.g., Server v. Mizell, 902 F.2d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that because of
the enlarged hymenal opening in the 9-year-old, the trial court's decision to allow the
child's statement to doctor, but "only as it related to the doctor's diagnosis of sexual as-
sault, was proper").
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the symptom. In contrast, if a symptom is inconsistent with abuse, no
abused children exhibit the symptom. Therefore, testimony that a
child's symptom is "consistent with" abuse rebuts the assumption that
no abused children exhibit the symptom. In terms of the relevance
ratio, testimony that a child's symptom is "consistent with" abuse re-
buts the assumption that the numerator of the ratio is zero, but says
nothing about the denominator.
Consider a case in which the defense introduces evidence sug-
gesting that abuse did not occur. For example, the defense may refer
to a substantial delay in time between the alleged abuse and the
child's first report, or the defense may stress the failure of the child's
physical examination to reveal any physical signs of abuse. If the ju-
rors are inclined to assume that all abused children report abuse
promptly or that all abused children show physical signs of abuse, the
facts emphasized by the defense appear inconsistent with the allega-
tion that abuse occurred. Testimony that some abused children delay
in reporting the abuse43 and that some abused children show no phys-
ical signs of abuse4 rebuts this assumption. Even if the jury under-
stands that not all abused children promptly report abuse or show
physical signs of abuse, the jury may still overestimate the percentage
of abused children who do so. Thus, testimony about delayed report-
ing of abuse or that a lack of physical signs is common among abused
children can help to overcome the false presumption that such evi-
dence is virtually non-existent among abused children.
Most courts allow prosecution experts to testify that an alleged
victim's behavior is "consistent with" abuse to rebut defense claims
that the behavior proves abuse did not occur.45 Although this reason-
ing is generally sound, courts must emphasize the limited purpose of
such testimony. Rebuttal testimony that a symptom is "consistent
with" abuse is not the same as testimony that a symptom is relevant for
proving that abuse occurred. In terms of the relevance ratio, rebuttal
testimony is equivalent to a claim that the numerator of the relevance
ratio is greater than zero, whereas testimony offered to prove that
abuse occurred is equivalent to a claim that the ratio is greater than
one.
43 See, e.g., People v. Gilbert, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 660, 667 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
44 See, e.g., People v. Rowland, 841 P.2d 897, 914 (Cal. 1992) (allowing doctor's testi-
mony that "the absence of genital trauma is not inconsistent with nonconsensual sexual
intercourse"); Susan Morison & Edith Greene, Juror and Expert Knowledge of Child Sexual
Abuse, 16 CHn.z ABUSE & NEGLECr 595, 608 (1992) (finding that over half of the lay survey
respondents believed that "most children are physically damaged" by sexual abuse).
45 SeeJoHN E.B. MYERS, EVmENCE IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGL Cr CASES 292 (2d ed.
1992) (discussing the use of rape trauma syndrome evidence as rebuttal testimony); id. at
310 (discussing rebuttal testimony about the behavior of child sexual abuse victims).
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Nevertheless, some courts and commentators have not appreci-
ated the difference between these two claims. For example, the New
Mexico Supreme Court reasoned that if admitting rebuttal testimony
that a child's behavior is "consistent with" abuse is permissible, admit-
ting testimony that a child's behavior is "consistent with" abuse to
prove that abuse occurred should also be permissible.46 Similarly fal-
lacious inferences appear in the literature among those who start with
the opposite premise. For example, commentator Robert Levy argues
that because symptoms of abuse are not relevant for proving that
abuse occurred, symptoms cannot be relevant in rebuttal.47 In both
cases, the error results from conflating that which is consistent with
abuse with that which is relevant for proving that abuse occurred.
Another error occurs when rebuttal testimony that a child's symp-
toms are "consistent with" abuse is treated as identical to testimony
that those symptoms are irrelevant to determining whether abuse oc-
curred. As noted above, rebuttal testimony merely demonstrates that
the numerator of the relevance ratio is nonzero (i.e., that at least
some abused children exhibit the symptom in question). But, even
with a numerator greater than zero, the evidence may be relevant evi-
dence that a child was not abused, if a larger proportion of nonabused
children exhibit the symptom than abused children. Thus, paradoxi-
cally, the same item of evidence may be valuable to the prosecution
for rebuttal purposes and to the defense as proof of nonabuse.
For example, a court may properly admit testimony that many
abused children have normal genitalia to rebut the assumption that
abused children invariably show physical signs of abuse. Testimony of
this sort demonstrates that the number of abused children with nor-
mal genitalia is greater than zero. However, it is likely that the pro-
46 See State v. Alberico, 861 P.2d 192, 210 (N.M. 1993) ("Allowing an expert to testify
that PTSD [post traumatic stress disorder] symptoms are a common reaction to sexual
assault for the purpose of rebutting the defense that the victim's reaction to the alleged
incident are inconsistent with sexual assault is no different from allowing the expert to
testify that the alleged victim's symptoms are consistent with sexual abuse."). Note that the
court refers to testimony that certain symptoms are a "common" reaction to abuse; the
significance of symptoms that are "common" rather than merely "consistent" is discussed
infra text accompanying notes 51-66. See also Steward v. State, 652 N.E.2d. 490, 501 (Ind.
1995) (Sullivan, J., dissenting) ("[We can[not] say that the scientific principles upon
which child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome is based are not reliable as direct evi-
dence but are reliable as rebuttal evidence. In logic, either those principles are reliable for
... aiding the jury in assessing the child victim's credibility or they are not.").
47 See Levy, supra note 6, at 394-95 (criticizing the defenders of the rehabilitative use
of child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome for lacking "an explanation of how a set of
symptoms that have no empirical justification for proving abuse can nonetheless be used to
prove that the child's recantation is false"). Cf. Cohen, supra note 6, at 444, 446. Cohen
objects to testimony that retracting allegations is a typical behavior for sexual abuse victims
because "[t]here is something fundamentally strange about saying that since the child de-
nies that the event occurred, it must have occurred." The error is in assuming that rebuttal
testimony suggests that abuse "must have" occurred, rather than "may have" occurred.
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portion of abused children with normal genitalia, albeit greater than
zero, is less than the proportion of nonabused children with normal
genitalia.48 Consequently, normal genitalia are "consistent with"
abuse, but, by a relevance ratio analysis, are also evidence that abuse
did not occur.49 The apparently paradoxical nature of this conclusion
disappears when one recognizes that evidence that is consistent with
one side's theory of a case may also be consistent with the other side's
theory. A relevance ratio analysis indicates which theory receives
greater support from such evidence. In this example, the evidence
should disabuse the jurors of the presumption that a lack of physical
signs conclusively disproves abuse, but the evidence should not lead
juries to believe that the lack of physical signs is totally irrelevant.50
The distinction between testimony that tends to prove that abuse
occurred and testimony that rebuts the assertion that abuse did not
occur clarifies some of the confusion about limitations on expert testi-
mony in child abuse cases. Some courts allow rebuttal testimony, but
exclude proof-of-abuse testimony on the ground that proof-of-abuse
testimony constitutes an impermissible comment on the credibility of
the child.51 This rationale leaves something to be desired. Both types
of testimony presuppose that the jury needs to be informed regarding
the probativeness of symptoms of abuse. Proof-of-abuse testimony in-
forms the jury that a symptom is more common among abused chil-
dren than among nonabused children, whereas rebuttal testimony
informs the jury that a symptom is more common among abused chil-
dren than the jury might otherwise have supposed (and, therefore,
less probative of nonabuse than the jury might believe). Therefore, to
the extent rebuttal testimony "invades the province of the jury" by tell-
ing jurors how to weigh the child's credibility, rebuttal testimony is as
objectionable as proof-of-abuse testimony.52 In terms of the relevance
ratio, however, evidence that is relevant for rebuttal is not necessarily
relevant for proving that abuse occurred. In other words, the ratio
allows courts to make a sensible distinction between the two ways in
which the evidence may be used.
48 This follows from the assumption that the proportion of abused children with ab-
normal genitalia is greater than the proportion of nonabused children with abnormal
genitalia.
49 Rebuttal experts will frequently note that lacking signs of abuse is not only consis-
tent with abuse, but common among abused children. Nevertheless, lacking a sign may
still be evidence that abuse did not occur, if nonabused children are more likely to lack
signs than abused children.
50 In this example, the relevance ratio is greater than zero because the ratio includes
a non-zero numerator, but is less than one because the denominator is greater than the
numerator.
51 See, e.g., State v. Moran, 728 P.2d 248, 254-55 (Ariz. 1986).
52 Indeed, this is the conclusion reached by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. See
Commonwealth v. Dunkle, 602 A.2d 830, 837 (Pa. 1992).
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In sum, testimony that a symptom is "consistent with" abuse is
relevant evidence when offered to rebut the misconception that the
symptom is nonexistent or uncommon among abused children. Such
testimony may disabuse a jury of the assumption that a symptom is
inconsistent with abuse and, therefore, conclusively disproves the
abuse hypothesis. However, the court must take care to ensure that a
jury is not misled into believing that the symptom is either irrelevant
or tends to prove that abuse did occur. Even if the symptom such as
normal genitalia occurs with some frequency among abused children,
it may still tend to prove that abuse did not occur if the defendant can
show that the symptom is even more common among nonabused
children.
V
ARE COMMON SYMPTOMS RELEVANT FOR PROVING ABUSE?
A psychologist's first priority when treating a sexually abused
child is the child's well-being. Effective treatment requires not only
an ability to analyze and understand the unique features of each
child's case, but also a thorough knowledge of the emotional and be-
havioral patterns of abused children. Once a therapist understands
these patterns, the therapist is in a better position to anticipate
problems and to prepare the child for the rough road that may lie
ahead. As research on common symptoms and patterns progresses,
the treatment of abused children will continue to improve.
Whereas identification of symptoms common among abused chil-
dren has therapeutic value, it may or may not have value for the ques-
tion of whether abuse occurred. What is common among abused
children and what is relevant for proving abuse are different. Com-
mon symptoms of abuse are relevant for proving abuse only if they are
less commonly observed in nonabused children. By the same token,
even uncommon symptoms of abuse may be highly relevant, if they
are still more uncommon among nonabused children. In short, the
frequency of a symptom is not synonymous with probativeness or rele-
vance. It is their relative frequency, as measured by the relevance ra-
tio, that indicates whether and to what extent a symptom is relevant
for proving that abuse occurred.
Research on the behavioral symptoms of sexually abused children
illustrates that common symptoms may be irrelevant and uncommon
symptoms may be relevant for proving abuse. Hibbard and Hartman
compared sexually abused children to nonabused children using a
number of behavioral and emotional variables.53 The authors found
53 Roberta A. Hibbard & Georgia L. Hartman, Behavioral Problems in Alleged Sexual
Abuse Vwtims, 16 CHiLD ABUSE & NEGLECr 755 (1992). Their study included 171 4-8 year
old children, 81 of whom were allegedly sexually abused, and 90 of whom were receiving
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that nightmares were one of the most common complaints, whereas
sexual problems and sex play were relatively less common. However,
they also found that nightmares are quite common among nonabused
children (in fact, they are slightly, but not significantly, more common
among nonabused children), whereas sexual problems and sex play
are virtually nonexistent in this group. Although an emphasis on fre-
quency would lead one to focus on symptoms that have little probative
value, a relevance ratio analysis reveals that sexual behavior may be
one of the most probative symptoms of sexual abuse. Subsequent re-
search supports the conclusion that certain types of highly sexualized
behavior (e.g., solicitations to engage in sexual acts and masturbation
with an object) are uncommon among abused children, but are even
more uncommon among children who have not been abused.5
Thus, despite being uncommon among abused children, sexual be-
havior is quite relevant for proving that abuse occurred.
The medical literature on sexual abuse contains similar examples
of common symptoms appearing irrelevant and uncommon symptoms
appearing relevant. The most common physical symptom of sexual
abuse is redness of the genitalia (erythema). 55 Doctors frequently
mention erythema in their testimony about abuse.56 However, be-
cause erythema does not appear to be more common among abused
children than among nonabused children, it is not relevant for prov-
ing that abuse occurred and should not be offered for this purpose.57
In contrast, doctors observe gonorrhea in less than 5% of sexually
abused children.58 But, because gonorrhea is virtually non-existent
among nonabused children who have not had sexual contact, it is
strong evidence that abuse has occurred.59
well-child care in a pediatric clinic; each child's parents completed the Child Behavior
Checklist; 41% of abused and 42% of nonabused reported nightmares; 19% of abused and
1% of nonabused reported sexual problems; 19% of abused and 0% of nonabused re-
ported too much sex play, 11% of abused and 3% of nonabused reported sex play in
public. Id. at 758. One should interpret these figures with caution, however, given the
potential for "detection biases" and other methodological problems, as discussed infra text
accompanying notes 86-96.
54 Friedrich et al. found a number of sexual behaviors that occurred among about
10% of abused children, but less than 1% of nonabused children, in a sample of 276
abused children and 880 nonabused children ages to twelve years. The behaviors included
"ask[ing] to engage in sex acts," "masturbat[ing] with object[s]," and "insert~ing] objects
in vagina/anus." William N. Friedrich et al., Child Sexual Behavior Inventoiy: Normative and
Clinical Comparisons, 4 PSYCHOL AssEssMENT 303, 307 (1992).
55 See, e.g., Emans et al., supra note 36, at 782 (concluding that erythema is the most
common physical finding among sexually abused sample).
56 See supra notes 29-32.
-57 See supra note 36.
58 See Bays & Chadwick, supra note 29, at 93 (reviewing six studies that found sexually
transmitted diseases in 2% to 7% of abused children).
59 See Deborah Stewart, Sexually Transmitted Diseases, in EVALUATION OF THE SEXUALLY
ABusED Cimiu: A MFnIcAL TEXTBOOK AWD PHOTOGRAPHIC ATLAs 145, 150 (1992). If per-
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These examples highlight the difference between symptoms that
are common among abused children and symptoms that are relevant
for proving that a child has been abused. Symptoms found among
abused children may be irrelevant for diagnosing abuse if those symp-
toms also occur among a broad range of nonabused children.60 .
A misguided focus on the typicality of symptoms has caused
courts to err in two distinct directions. Some courts relying on the
commonality of the symptom have allowed expert testimony regard-
ing symptoms of abuse as a means of proving that abuse occurred.61
Other courts and some commentators have opposed admitting expert
inatal transmission is ruled out, gonorrhea is considered diagnostic of sexual abuse. See
Adams, supra note 37, at 13; American Academy of Pediatrics, Committee on Child Abuse
and Neglect, Guidelines for the Evaluation of Sexual Abuse of Children, 87 PEmAmrucs 254, 257
(1991); Bays & Chadwick, supra note 29.
60 This is not to say that symptoms used for the purposes of treating sexual abuse are
necessarily irrelevant in proving sexual abuse, as some courts and commentators have con-
cluded. See, e.g., People v. Beckley, 456 N.W.2d 391, 405 (Mich. 1990) ("Child sexual abuse
syndrome is not intended as a diagnostic tool for detection of sexual abuse. Thus, it has no
probative value in terms of being able to detect sexual abuse on the basis of the existence
of certain behavioral characteristics."); Askowitz & Graham, supra note 6, at 2046 ("Post-
traumatic stress disorder merely is a therapeutic tool; it is not designed to determine sexual
abuse. In practice, however, experts ignore these limitations of the PTSD diagnosis and use
it to opine that the child has been sexually abused."). For example, children who have
been sexually abused are often tested for gonorrhea, so that if they have been infected,
they may be treated. That the presence of gonorrhea is useful in determining treatment
says nothing about the probative value of gonorrhea. Coincidentally, however, gonorrhea
is highly probative of abuse. See Lawrence S. Neinstein et al., Nonsexual Transmission of
Sexually Transmitted Diseases: An Infrequent Occurrence, 74 PEDATrucs 67, 67-68 (1984).
61 See United States v. Snipes, 18 M.J. 172, 179 (1984) (allowing an expert to conclude
that the child was abused, because there is a "sufficient body of 'specialized knowledge' as
to the typical behavior of sexually abused children"); Ward v. State, 519 So. 2d 1082, 1083
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (allowing expert testimony that the child "displayed the symp-
toms typically seen in children who have been sexually abused"); State v. Reser, 767 P.2d
1277, 1280 (Kan. 1989) (allowing expert testimony that the child "exhibits some of the
characteristics commonly found in sexually abused children"); State v. Donnelly, 798 P.2d
89, 91 (Mont. 1990) (allowing expert testimony "concerning general symptoms often
found in children who have been sexually abused"), rev'd on other grounds, 813 P.2d 979
(Mont. 1991); State v. Schumpert, 435 S.E.2d 859, 861 (S.C. 1993) (approving expert testi-
mony that "the victim's behavioral symptoms were typical for a victim of sexual abuse");
State v. Stevens, 794 P.2d 38, 41 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (allowing expert testimony "that
sexually abused children exhibit common behaviors"); Rivera v. State, 840 P.2d 933, 939
(Wyo. 1992) (approving expert testimony "explaining to the jury the typical behavioral
patterns of adolescent victims of sexual assault"). Testimony as to the typical characteris-
tics of child abuse victims has been admitted by other courts without explicit reference to
the "typicality" of symptoms. See State v. Hammond, 435 S.E.2d 798, 802 (N.C. C. App.
1993) ("It was proper for [the expert] to discuss the symptoms and characteristics of sexu-
ally abused children and to express, in her expert opinion, whether the minor child exhib-
ited similar characteristics."); State v. Edward Charles L., 398 S.E.2d 123, 139 (W.Va. 1990)
(allowing expert testimony that a child had been abused, because "children who are sexu-
ally abused or assaulted frequently display indications which may comport to a profile of
child victims").
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testimony on the consequences of abuse arguing that such symptoms
are so uncommon that they are of limited relevance. 62
For example, in State v. Foret, the Supreme Court of Louisiana
held that a finding that 68% of abused children suffer from certain
symptoms of abuse is not sufficient to render these symptoms relevant
and probative.63 The court reasoned that if 32% of abused children
do not exhibit these symptoms (a proportion that the court identified
as a "32% margin of error"), testimony about the presence of these
symptoms is "unreliable. '64 But, for reasons articulated throughout
this Article, this logic does not withstand careful scrutiny. An assess-
ment of probative value does not require a comparison of the propor-
tion of abused who exhibit the symptoms to the proportion of abused
children who do not exhibit the symptom. Nor does a conclusion that
the symptom is probative of abuse require that the proportion of
abused who do not exhibit the symptom be less than some predeter-
mined "margin of error." Instead, the probative value is determined
by the ratio of the properties of abused children who exhibit the
symptom to the proportion of nonabused children who exhibit the
symptom. If the symptom occurs more frequently among abused chil-
dren than among nonabused children, yielding a relevance ratio
greater than one, the symptom is relevant for proving that abuse
occurred.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court also surrendered to the tempta-
tion to use a symptom's typicality in the abused population as a proxy
for assessing its relevance and probative value. In Commonwealth v.
Dunkle, the court concluded that because "abused children cannot be
fit into any specific behavior patterns... [and because] not one, sin-
gle symptom was exhibited by a majority of sexually abused children
... [c]learly, these types of percentages cannot constitute probative
evidence." 65 But probative value does not require that the symptom in
question occur among a majority or even a large proportion of abused
62 See Askowitz & Graham, supra note 6, at 2085-86 (arguing that there are no typical
symptoms of child abuse); Lisa K Askowitz, Comment, Restricting the Admissibility of Expert
Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: Pennsylvania Takes it to the Extreme, 47 U. MIAMI
L. Rav. 201, 208-09 (1992) ("[S]tudies have revealed the absence of a single, typical child
abuse victim .... In fact, almost every study of the impact of sexual abuse on children has
found a substantial group of victims with little or no symptomatology."); Cohen, supra note
6, at 440 (arguing that there are no typical consequences of abuse); McCord, supra note 6,
at 19-20 ("Because of the variability of responses, researchers have been frank to admit that
they simply cannot tell what the reactions to sexual abuse of any particular child will be....
Since there are no typical symptoms, diagnosis is very difficult.").
63 628 So. 2d 1116, 1126 (La. 1993).
64 Id.
65 602 A.2d 830, 835 n.16 (Pa. 1992). See also Gier v. Educational Serv. Unit No. 16,
845 F. Supp. 1342, 1348 n.10 (D. Neb. 1994) (quoting Dunhkl 602 A.2d at 835 n.16), aff'd,
66 F.3d 940 (8th Cir. 1995). For a discussion of Dunkles treatment of the denominator of
the relevance ratio, see infra text accompanying notes 108-09.
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children.66 Nor does probative value require that the symptom be ab-
sent from nonabused children. As indicated throughout this Article,
all that is necessary is a greater frequency of the symptom among the
abused than among the nonabused population.
Dunkle is also noteworthy for its discussion of the court's under-
standing of relevance. This elaboration contains some serious short-
comings. First, the court notes that relevant evidence is evidence that
makes a fact in issue more probable than it would be without the evi-
dence. 67 This much is correct. But, the court subsequently para-
phrases this standard as a requirement that relevant evidence make a
fact in issue "more probable than not."68 Here the court actually re-
defines, rather than paraphrases, the relevance standard. A symptom
may make abuse more probable without making it "more probable
than not." A symptom that doubles the probability of abuse from 20%
to 40% is relevant under a relevance ratio analysis; the symptom, how-
ever, would not be relevant by the "more probable than not" standard
imposed by the Pennsylvania Court. Commentators have discussed
the confusion between evidence that makes a fact in issue "more prob-
able" versus "more probable than not" in other contexts as well.69
The Pennsylvania Court's insistence that a symptom can make
abuse "more likely than not" only when it is present in more than half
of all abused children exacerbates its confusion. This requirement is
neither necessary nor sufficient for a symptom to make abuse "more
likely than not." If a symptom appears among few abused children,
but among still fewer nonabused children, that symptom could make
abuse "more likely than not"; conversely, if a symptom appeared
among most abused children, but among somewhat fewer nonabused
children, that symptom may nonetheless fail to make abuse "more
likely than not."
Both proponents and critics of behavioral science testimony in
child sexual abuse cases have fallen prey to the error of conflating
commonality with relevance. Familiarity with the relevance ratio
would enable all parties, including trial judges who must make admis-
sibility decisions, to identify the degree of probative value of a wide
66 See supra text accompanying notes 58-59 (presence of gonorrhea is probative of
abuse, because it appears in five percent of abused children, but in an even smaller propor-
tion of nonabused children).
67 Dunk/ 602 A.2d at 834.
68 Id.
69 See JOHN W. STRONG ET AL, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185, at 776-77 (4th ed.
1992); see also People v. Green, 578 N.Y.S.2d 113, 116 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991) ("[a]ssuming
arguendo, that defendant is correct that the probability he was accurately identified is less
than 1/2, it does not necessarily follow that the identification testimony could not, with
proper instructions, be submitted to the jury .... [T]he thrust of defendant's argument
affects the weight of identification testimony and not its admissibility.").
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range of symptoms. Many common symptoms are only marginally rel-
evant, and many uncommon symptoms have great probative value.
VI
ARE CLUSTERS OF SYMPTOMS RELEVANT FOR
PROVING ABUSE?
Some argue that even though individual symptoms of abuse may
not be probative, the appearance of multiple symptoms (i.e., a cluster
of symptoms) is highly suggestive of abuse.70 Presumably, the appear-
ance of a cluster of symptoms is uncommon among nonabused chil-
dren. Although this position has intuitive appeal, clusters of
symptoms may be far less probative than they at first appear to be.
There are several reasons why this is true.
First, a cluster of symptoms is almost certain to be more common
than a single symptom among both abused and nonabused popula-
tions. This increased frequency occurs largely because of the vast
number of symptoms that are associated with abuse. Assume, for ex-
ample, that there are ten symptoms of abuse.71 There are only ten
ways in which a single symptom alone might present itself (e.g., symp-
tom #1 only, symptom #2 only, .. ., symptom #10 only). However,
there are more than one thousand ways in which two or more symp-
toms may appear (e.g., symptoms #1 and #2 only, symptoms #1, #2,
and #3 only, etc.) .72 Unless all of the individual symptoms are exceed-
ingly rare, the probability that a cluster will present itself in a
nonabused child will be substantially greater than the probability that
a single symptom will present itself. In other words, because so many
70 See, e.g., State v. Michaels, 625 A.2d 489, 497 (N.J. Super. C. App. Div. 1993) (not-
ing that the expert testified "that what is crucial is the clustering of those [behavioral]
symptoms" along with other indicators of abuse), affd, 642 A.2d 13721 State v. Hammond,
435 S.E.2d 798, 802 (N.C. CL App. 1993) (explaining that the expert testified that "'none
of these symptoms by itself is a total indication that sexual abuse is present, but I think with
the clustering of these symptoms that [the minor child] showed, that there is a very high
probability that she had been sexually abused.'").
71 This is a conservative estimate. See Michaels, 625 A.2d at 496 (noting that the expert
testified that she used a list of 32 behaviors.); Dunkl, 602 A.2d at 835 n.16 (reviewing study
that examined 38 behaviors); Friedrich et al., supra note 54, at 304 (noting that the Child
Sexual Behavior Inventory assesses 35 sexualized behaviors); Kendall-Tackett et al., supra
note 19, at 166 (reviewing research on 24 symptoms).
72 The number of clusters of symptoms (i.e., sets of two or more symptoms) associ-
ated with a set of n symptoms is given by the following formula:
Thus, there are
2c- (1)b (10)r 1,013
clusters possible from a set of 10 possible symptoms.
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different possibilities exist, one should not be surprised to find clus-
ters of symptoms among children who have not been abused.
To make this argument more concrete, consider the following
example. Assume that each of the ten symptoms appears among
twenty percent of nonabused children. Assume further that the symp-
toms are conditionally independent. This means that the presence or
absence of any one of the ten symptoms does not affect the likelihood
that any of the remaining nine symptoms will present themselves. 73
The probability that a nonabused child will exhibit one symptom is
only 27%. 74 However, the probability that a child will exhibit two or
more symptoms is a hefty 62%. 75 Of course, the probability associated
with the presence of exactly one symptom or the presence of multiple
symptoms is a function both of the individual symptom's probability
and the number of possible symptoms. But, under most reasonable
sets of assumptions about these values, the probability that a
nonabused child will exhibit a cluster of symptoms is substantially
greater than the probability that this child will exhibit only a single
symptom. 76 That clusters of symptoms may be common among chil-
dren who have not been abused has important implications for an
assessment of the probative value of symptom clusters. Even if an ex-
tremely large proportion of abused children exhibit a particular clus-
ter of symptoms, this cluster may be of minimal diagnostic value if a
large proportion of nonabused children also exhibit this cluster of
symptoms. Thus, the intuition that the presence of multiple symp-
toms must be diagnostic of abuse vanishes under the scrutiny of rele-
vance ratio analysis.
We suspect that the false belief that clusters of symptoms must be
probative of abuse is in part attributable to a failure to distinguish
between the probability that a particular cluster of symptoms will oc-
cur, a rare event, and the probability that a cluster of symptoms of
some sort will occur (a frequent event).77 Returning to our example,
suppose a child displays symptoms 1, 2, and 3, but does not display
73 More formally, symptoms A and B are conditionally independent ifP(A)=P(AI B)=P(Aj-B).
74
P(Single symptom)= (1 ) (.2)'(.8)5=.27
75 P(2 or more symptoms) = 1 - (10 1)(.2)1(.8)9 - (10 0)(.2)0(.8)10 = 1 - .38 = .62.
P(Single symptom)= 1- (1,0) (.2)-(.8)1o-. ('0) (.2)1(.8)-=.62.
76 Exceptions to this generalization occur when few possible symptoms exist or when
those symptoms are rare.
77 A similar phenomenon underlies people's intuitions in the famous "birthday prob-
lem." See THoMAs GILOViCH, How WE KNOW WHAT ISN'T SO (1991). Gilovich writes:
When asked to consider the probability that at least two people in a group
of a particular size were born on the same day of the year, most people are
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symptoms 4 through 10. Although the probability that a nonabused
child would exhibit this particular cluster of three symptoms is rare,
less than 0.2%,78 the probability that a nonabused child would exhibit
some cluster of three symptoms is a surprisingly high 20.1%.79 This
dramatic increase is attributable to the large number of ways in which
clusters of three or more symptoms can occur when the list of possible
symptoms is large (i.e., as great as ten). Unless an expert has specified
in advance the particular clusters he or she considers most significant,
any cluster that presents itself, in retrospect, will likely appear sugges-
tive of abuse.
Belief in the probative value of clusters may also persist because
of the correlated nature of the symptoms. The ten-symptoms hypo-
thetical assimed that each symptom appeared independently of the
other nine symptoms. This assumption simplified the computations
and illustrated the point that clusters of symptoms may be common
among nonabused children. However, it is likely that many abuse
symptoms tend to occur contemporaneously, among both abused and
nonabused children.80 To the extent this is true, these symptoms are
likely to cluster among both abused and nonabused children. In such
a case, the presence of multiple symptoms in a cluster may tell one
little more than if a single symptom existed. The additional symptoms
are essentially redundant information and do not help to distinguish
between abused and nonabused children.8'
shocked to learn that the odds are roughly 50-50 when the group is as small
as 23....
... Many people approach the problem with a fairly accurate sense of the
long odds against a partiular pair of people having the same birthday (ap-
proximately 1/365), but they fail to appreciate how many different pairs of
people there are (253) in a group of 23.
Id. at 175-77.
78 P(1-2-8) cluster = (.2)1(.8)'= .0017.
79 P(cluster of 3 symptoms) =
'0) (.2)1(8)7=201
Other things being equal, the appearance of clusters of symptoms will become more com-
mon as the number of possible symptoms increases.
80 Symptoms examined in the research on behavioral reactions to abuse are often
very similar (e.g., anxious/feels too guilty/worries or trouble sleeping/nightmares). See,
e.g., Hibbard & Hartman, supra note 58, at 758. Any child who suffers one of these related
symptoms is more likely to suffer other similar symptoms, whether or not that child has
been abused.
81 Research suggests that people do not understand that confidence in one's judg-
ments should decrease, rather than increase, when the predictors are highly correlated.
Kahneman and Tversky called the tendency to become increasingly confident in the face
of correlated predictors the "illusion of validity." Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On
the Psychology of Predidion, inJUDGMENT UNDER UNcERTAINTY HEURISTICS AND BIASES 48, 65-
66 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
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Some experts have argued that "allegations of sexual abuse com-
bined with certain other behavioral reactions make the 'non-proba-
tive' reactions more probative of sexual abuse in the clinical
context. '8 2 This argument does not withstand scrutiny. Not only are
there no data to support this empirical claim, but it is hard to imagine
how a symptom that is not relevant for proving that abuse occurred
becomes relevant simply by being paired with a symptom that is
relevant.
On the other hand, many situations exist in which clusters of
symptoms are substantially more probative than single symptoms. In
abuse cases involving infants, skeletal fractures at different stages of
healing constitute highly probative evidence of abuse, whereas a sin-
gle skeletal fracture, standing alone, provides only moderately proba-
tive evidence of abuse.8 3 Children with fractures who were abused are
more likely than accidentally injured children to have been seriously
injured at a previous time, making multiple fractures much more
common among abused than nonabused children.8 4
In sum, intuition may not provide a reliable method for deter-
mining the probative value of symptom clusters.8 5 The observation
that a particular symptom cluster (e.g., nightmares + anxiety + low
self-esteem) occurs more frequently in abused populations than any
of the individual symptoms alone does not demonstrate relevance. To
demonstrate relevance, research must show that the particular cluster
is more likely to appear in abused children than in nonabused chil-
dren. To date, remarkably little data exist that support the strong
82 Patricia A. Korey, Evidence-Rehabilitative Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases:
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Shuts the Door on Effective Prosecutions-Commonwealth v.
Dunkle, 602 A.2d 830 (Pa. 1992), 66 TmsLE L. Rnv. 589, 605 (1992). Korey's statement is
understandable, given the premise that what makes some symptoms non-probative is that
they may be attributable to causes other than sexual abuse. Id. at 605-06. Korey's state-
ment, however, is itself untrue. The possibility of alternate causes indicates that some
nonabused children will exhibit the symptoms, but does not mean that the symptoms are
therefore irrelevant. The article on which Korey bases her argument clarifies this point.
The paper concludes that "[w]hen symptoms of fear, anxiety, or avoidance accompany a
credible report of sexual abuse, sexual abuse must be seriously considered." John E.B.
Myers et al., Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Litigation, 68 NEB. L Ruv. 1, 61 (1989).
Myers et al. do not in fact argue that such symptoms are non-probative of abuse; rather,
they comment upon the possibility that the symptoms are attributable to other traumatic
events besides abuse. Id. at 60-61. Subsequently, they clarify that an expert should not
"describe a combination of behaviors, some of which are probative of abuse and some of
which are not." Id. at 69.
83 See Helen Carty, Brittle or Battered, 63 ARcsrvEs OF DIsnASE iN CHLDREN 350, 350
(1988); C.J. Hobbs, Fractures, 298 BRrr.J. MED. 1015, 1015 (1989).
84 See Peter Worlock et al., Patterns of Fractures in Accidental and Non-Accidental Injury in
Children: A Comparative Study, 293 Brr. MED. J. 100, 101 (1986) (studying 35 abused chil-
dren and 116 non-abused children with fractures and finding abused children much more
likely than nonabused children to have multiple fractures).
85 Cf Koehler & Shaviro, supra note 23, at 266-72.
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claims concerning the probative value of clusters made by some clini-
cians at trial.
VII
ARE ALL STuDIEs CRATED EQUAL?
Although assessing the relevance of possible symptoms of abuse
requires studies that compare abused and nonabused children, not all
such studies are equally informative. Methodological shortcomings
exist in some studies that falsely inflate the probative value of certain
symptoms of abuse.
The most serious methodological shortcoming that courts should
guard against is "selection bias."186 In the context of abuse studies,
selection bias occurs when the abused and nonabused children who
are selected for study differ in ways that may affect the variables mea-
sured in the studies. For example, suppose a study draws a sample of
abused children from among those who are in therapy for psychologi-
cal problems, but draws a nonabused comparison sample from among
children who are not in therapy. In such a study, a substantially
higher proportion of the abused children will likely exhibit psycholog-
ical problems, even problems that are not related to abuse.87
One way to redress this problem is to compare abused children
who are in therapy with nonabused children who are in therapy for
problems other than abuse.88 In this type of therapy-matched study,
one can be more confident that the problems that are more frequent
among the abused children than the nonabused children are diagnos-
tic of abuse.89 A review of these studies found that many symptoms
86 See HARVEY CHECKOWAY ET AL., RESEARCH METHODS IN OCCUPATIONAL EPIDEMIOLOGY
77 (1989) ("Selection bias is any bias arising from the procedures by which the study subjects
were chosen from the entire population that theoretically could be studied.").
87 See Kendall-Tackett et al., supra note 19, at 165 (stating that most of studies re-
viewed on the effects of sexual abuse "primarily drew from sexual abuse evaluation or treat-
ment programs"). The researchers themselves frequently recognize the problem this
presents. See, e.g., AlisonJ. Einbender & William N. Friedrich, Psychological Functioning and
Behavior of Sexually Abused Girls, 57 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL 155, 155 (1989)
("[D]ifferences between these two groups of girls [abused and nonabused] may have exis-
ted as a result of selection criteria for the sexually abused girls, most of whom were re-
ferred to the study by clinicians."); William N. Friedrich et al., Behavior Problems in Sexually
Abused Young Children, 11 J. PFrDIATRC PSYCHOL. 47, 49 (1986) ("Due to the fact that chil-
dren demonstrating more problems are more likely to be referred for treatment, as a
group these children are probably displaying a more pronounced response to the abuse.").
88 Another solution is to draw both the abused and nonabused samples from the pop-
ulation of children in general, rather than from among those in therapy. Unfortunately,
this solution is difficult to implement, because it is hard to identify and recruit abused
children who are not in treatment.
89 To the extent that children are referred to treatment solely because they were sexu-
ally abused, and not because of psychological problems, these comparisons may underesti-
mate the effects of sexual abuse on psychological functioning. See Kendall-Tackett et al.,
supra note 19, at 165. They state:
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(e.g., aggressive behavior, hyperactivity) do not occur more com-
monly among abused children in therapy than among nonabused
children in therapy.90 On the other hand, some symptoms appear
more frequently among abused children, such as sexualized
behavior.91
"Detection bias" is a second methodological problem. "Detection
bias" occurs when the presence of a symptom increases the chances
that abuse will be detected.92 Although observing symptoms is a use-
ful strategy for detecting abuse, one must then exercise care when
assessing the diagnostic strength of these symptoms. If children are
classified as abused or nonabused on the basis of certain symptoms, it
is circular to estimate the diagnostic value of those symptoms based on
children thus classified.93 If one uses physical signs as a means of dis-
[C]linical comparison groups generally contain many children who are re-
ferred primarily because of their symptomatic behavior. Naturally these
children are likely to be more symptomatic than children referred not be-
cause of symptoms, but because of something done to them (i.e., abuse).
Thus, the lower levels of symptoms in sexually abused children may say
more about the clinical comparisons than about the sexually abused chil-
dren themselves.
Id.
90 See Kendall-Tackett et al., supra note 19, at 165-66.
91 In a review of the research Kendall-Tackett et al. found that sexually abused chil-
dren consistently exhibited sexualized behavior more often than nonabused children.
Kendall-Tackett et al., supra note 19, at 165-66. See also Esther Deblinger et al., Post-Trau-
matic Stress in Sexually Abused, Physically Abused, and Nonabused Children, 13 CHILD ABUSE &
NEGLEar 403, 406 (1989) (finding that in a retrospective chart review of medical inpatients
at psychiatric facility (29 sexually abused, 29 physically abused, and 29 nonabused chil-
dren), "[s] exually abused children ... suffered significantly more reexperiencing phenom-
ena than either physically abused or nonabused subjects [and that an] examination of the
symptoms within this PTSD subcategory revealed that this was attributable to the signifi-
cantly higher rate of inappropriate sexual behaviors displayed by child sexual abuse vic-
tims."); William N. Friedrich, The Clinical Use of the Child Sexual Behavior Inventory: Commonly
Asked Questions, 8 APSAC ADVISOR 1, 18 (1995) (stating that a preliminary analysis of 100
psychiatric patients found that although they had elevated levels of sexualized behavior
relative to normal children, they had lower levels than group of sexually abused children.);
John Gale et al., Sexual Abuse in Young Children: Its Clinical Presentation and Characteristic
Patterns, 12 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECr 163, 166 (1988) (studying 37 sexually abused children,
35 physically abused children, and 130 nonabused children, all of whom were seen at a
community mental health clinic, and finding that "[i]nappropriate sexual behavior was
noted in 41% of the sexually abused groups, but in less than 5% of the other two groups");
David B. Goldston et al., Presenting Problems of Sexually Abused Girls Receiving Psychiatric Serv-
ice, 98 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 314, 316 (1989) (studying 128 abused and 67 nonabused
girls, all of whom were receiving mental health services and finding that "[i]n a clinic
population, the contribution of sexual abuse to psychiatric symptoms is quite specific").
92 See MICHAEL S. KRAMER, CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGy AND BIOSTATISTICS 53 (1988).
93 This problem arises even when the symptom is not explicitly used in evaluation as a
criterion for distinguishing between abused and nonabused children, but is a means by
which children come to the attention of individuals who are interested in diagnosing
abuse. For example, if a child exhibits unusual behavior, he or she is more likely to be
questioned about abuse. This questioning, in turn, increases the chances that abuse will be
discovered. See William N. Friedrich & Redmond A. Reams, Course of Psychological Symptoms
in Sexually Abused Young Children, 24 PSCHOTHMERAPY 160, 163 (1987) ("For several of the
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tinguishing between abused and nonabused children, physical signs
will necessarily appear to be more common among abused children
than among nonabused children.94
A second form of "detection bias" occurs when the diagnosis of
abuse increases the chance that a symptom will be detected. This
problem arises when children who have been classified as abused are
questioned about particular symptoms more vigorously than children
who have not been classified as abused. For example, psychologists
often probe for behavioral signs of abuse in children who have been
diagnosed as abused, but search less vigilantly for behavioral signs in
children who have been classified as nonabused.95 Moreover, a par-
ent whose child has been diagnosed as abused may selectively recall or
construe the child's behavior as evincing the symptom. 96 As a result,
studies often find behavioral signs in abused children at a higher rate
than among nonabused children. What remains unknown is whether
an equally vigilant search for behavioral signs among nonabused chil-
dren would have produced an increase in the reported proportion of
nonabused children with these symptoms.
children, it was their behavioral deterioration that prompted parental concern, leading to
their discovery of abuse."); Teena Sorensen & Barbara Snow, How Children Tell: The Process
of Disclosure in Child Sexual Abuse, 70 0mw.D WELFARE 3, 8 (1991) (finding that for 29% of
the children between three to five years old, the impetus for discovery of sexual abuse was
"behavioral sign" or "sexualized behavior"). Physical signs of sexual abuse may create this
problem as well. Se, e.g., S.B. v. P.G.B., 600 So. 2d 256, 257 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991) ("The
mother... testified that she became concerned that her son had been sexually abused
when she noticed redness around his anus following his return from a visit with his fa-
ther."). "Detection bias" is particularly troublesome in the case of symptoms that are easily
visible and/or widely believed to be associated with abuse, because these types of symptoms
most often lead to further examination of the child.
94 One way to control for "detection bias" in research is to include within the group
designated as abused only those children whose abuse status was determined on grounds
other than the symptom in question. For example, one could examine the behavior of
children whose abuse status was determined by means of medical evidence or through
statements by the child, and not with reference to the child's behavior. By testing the
ability of the Child Sexual Behavioral Inventory (CSBI) to discriminate between abused
and nonabused children using a sample of abused children whose abuse status was not
confirmed by means of the CSBI, Friedrich et al. take one step towards this safeguard.
Friedrich et al., supra note 54, at 304. However, the authors did not control for the possi-
bility that the clinicians in the study relied on less formal reports of sexualized behavior in
concluding that abuse occurred.
95 If the method of the study is a retrospective review of children's records this prob-
lem is especially serious, since the records are limited to those observations that the treat-
ing therapist both discovered and thought important for the child's diagnosis. See, e.g.,
Goldston et al., supra note 91, at 315 ("For coding purposes, the absence of a reference to a
behavior problem was assumed to reflect an absence of that problem.").
96 See Friedrich, supra note 91, at 18 (studying children under 35 months of age using
the Child Sexual Behavior Inventory, and finding that children involved in custody dis-
putes who the researchers concluded had not in fact been abused received some of the
highest scores).
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In sum, both types of "detection bias" tend to inflate the value of
the relevance ratio. The first type inflates the ratio by pushing the
numerator of the ratio toward one (i.e., by increasing the proportion
of abused who reportedly exhibit the symptom), and the second type
inflates the ratio by pushing the denominator toward zero (i.e., by
decreasing the proportion of nonabused who reportedly exhibit the
symptom).
Empirical research that compares the symptoms of abused chil-
dren with those of nonabused children is necessary to identify the pro-
bative value of these symptoms for the detection of abuse. However,
the research must be carefully examined to ensure that the conclu-
sions it yields about the apparent relevance of symptoms are not
tainted by biased research procedures. Apparent relevance may be
inflated when the abused sample is drawn from a clinical sample,
when the symptom increases the chances that abuse will be detected,
or when the diagnosis of abuse increases the likelihood that the symp-
tom will be detected. Because these biases are difficult to eliminate, as
a practical matter, courts should treat as presumptively irrelevant
symptoms that are only slightly more common among abused chil-
dren than among nonabused children.
VIII
Is THE ABSENCE OF SYMPTOMS RELEVANT FOR
DISPROVING ABUSE?
Relevance or probative value may be tied to the absence as well as
to the presence of particular symptoms or behaviors. Just as a finding
of vaginal trauma in a young girl may be evidence that penetration
occurred, a failure to find such trauma may be evidence that the pene-
tration did not occur. This observation prompts the following ques-
tions: If the presence of a symptom is relevant for proving that abuse
occurred, is the absence of the symptom relevant for proving that
abuse did not occur? And if so, are presence and absence of the symp-
tom equally relevant?
The answer to the first question is "yes": If a symptom is relevant
for proving that abuse occurred, the absence of the symptom is also
relevant for proving that abuse did not occur.97 The answer to the
second question is "no": In most instances, presence and absence are
not equally probative evidence. Indeed, situations exist in which the
probative asymmetry between the presence of a symptom and its ab-
sence is so great that a court may reasonably find the symptom admis-
97 A relevance ratio analysis shows that for mutually exclusive and exhaustive hypothe-
ses, H0 and H 1, if evidence E is probative of H 0, then the absence of E is probative of HI.
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sible when present, but insufficiently relevant when absent (and vice
versa).
To understand why if evidence is relevant for proving that abuse
occurred, the absence of such evidence must be relevant for proving
that abuse did not occur, assume that (a) children can be classified as
suffering from anxiety or as being anxiety-free and (b) anxiety is rele-
vant for proving that abuse occurred. Assumption (b) requires that
the percentage of abused children with anxiety is higher than the per-
centage of nonabused children with anxiety. Therefore, the percent-
age of nonabused children who are anxiety-free must also be higher
than the percentage of abused children who are anxiety-free. Conse-
quently, being anxiety-free is evidence that one was not abused.98
Questions about whether the absence of a symptom constitutes
relevant evidence arise most frequently in cases involving rape trauma
syndrome. Unfortunately, some courts have not reasoned well about
the probative value of this evidence. For example, the Kansas
Supreme Court argued that "[t]here are no statistics to show that
there is any value to a negative finding that the rape trauma syndrome
is not exhibited by the alleged victim."99 But as indicated above, if
statistics demonstrate the relevance of rape trauma syndrome for
proving that abuse occurred, those same statistics demonstrate the rel-
evance of a failure to exhibit rape trauma syndrome for proving that
abuse did not occur.
The Montana Supreme Court also rejected symptom-absent testi-
mony on the ground that "[t] he absence of evidence of psychological
trauma logically does not prove that the offense did not occur.' u00
98 This may be proved as follows: The relevance ratio associated with evidence E is
P(EIH) X
P(EIR) Y'
and the relevance ratio associated with E is
P(RIH) 1-X
P (EIf)- 1-Y
If E is relevant for proving H, then X>Y, (because when and only when X>Y will the rele-
vance ratio be greater than one). Furthermore, if X>Y then -X < -Y, 1-X < 1-Y, 1-X/1-Y
<1 . Because the relevance ratio associated with E( cH) 1-XP(R I f) - 1-Y
< 1, R is probative of I. In general, then, the absence of a symptom is relevant for proving
that a condition did not occur whenever the presence of the symptom is relevant for prov-
ing that a condition did occur (and vice versa).
99 State v. McQuillen, 689 P.2d 822, 830 (Kan. 1984).
100 State v. Scheffelman, 820 P.2d 1293, 1299 (Mont. 1991) (citing State v. Gilpin, 756
P.2d 445, 451 (Mont. 1988)). See also Myers et al., supra note 82, at 64 ("Absence of behav-
iors does not disprove abuse, but presence of behaviors increases the likelihood of
abuse."); Nicole Rosenberg Economou, Note, Defense Expert Testimony on Rape Trauma Syn-
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Although a lack of trauma does not logically or conclusively prove that
rape did not occur, a logical proof test of relevance is too restrictive.
Rape trauma syndrome does not conclusively prove that rape oc-
curred, but presence of the syndrome is relevant if it increases the
likelihood that rape occurred. Similarly, the lack of trauma may be
relevant for proving that abuse did not occur, even though absence of
the syndrome does not constitute conclusive proof.
A. Probative Asymmetry
Although the absence of a symptom is relevant if the presence of
that symptom is relevant, the relevance of presence or absence for
proving or disproving abuse, respectively, is rarely the same. Depend-
ing upon the relative proportions of abused and nonabused children
who exhibit a symptom, a symptom may be strong evidence of abuse
when present, but weak evidence against abuse when absent. Con-
versely, a symptom may be weak evidence of abuse when present, but
strong evidence against abuse when absent.
B. Presence More Relevant Than Absence
When is a symptom strong evidence of abuse when present, but
weak evidence against abuse when absent? Generally, this occurs
when the evidence is uncommon among abused children, but even
more uncommon among children who have not been abused. Specif-
ically, if the sum of the proportion of abused children who exhibit the
symptom plus the proportion of nonabused children who exhibit the
symptom is less than 100%, then the presence of the symptom is more
probative for proving abuse than is the absence of the symptom for
disproving abuse.101
As noted above, this is true of sexually transmitted diseases
("STD's"), which occur in about 5% of abused children, but almost
never occur in nonabused children. Although the presence of an
STD is strong evidence that a child was abused, the absence of an STD
is weak evidence that a child was not abused. An example illustrates
this point. Suppose that 5% of sexually abused children are sympto-
matic and only 1% of nonabused children are symptomatic. The pres-
ence of an STD is moderately relevant, because it yields a relevance
ratio of .05/.01 = 5. How relevant is the absence of the symptom for
drome: Implications for the Stoic Victim, 42 HASTNGs L.J. 1143, 1155 (1991) ("Although evi-
dence of the degree to which a woman suffered physical or emotional injuries does tend to
corroborate a rape charge, a lack of perceptible injuries or trauma does not demonstrate
that a woman was not raped.").
101 As the probative value of the symptom's presence increases (i.e., as the ratio of the
two proportions increases), the relevance of the symptom's absence also increases, but not
as steeply.
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disproving abuse? The relevance ratio for proof that abuse did not
occur requires one to compare the proportion of asymptomatic
abused children and the proportion of asymptomatic nonabused chil-
dren.10 2 Because 5% of abused children are symptomatic, 95% of
abused children are asymptomatic. Similarly, 1% of nonabused chil-
dren are symptomatic, 99% of nonabused children are asymptomatic.
Thus, the absence of the symptom is only slightly relevant, because it
yields a relevance ratio of .99/.95 = 1.04. Although relevance ratios
that exceed one are, technically speaking, relevant, relevance ratios
that are so close to one are probably best excluded on grounds of
minimal relevance'103
C. Absence More Relevant Than Presence
When is a symptom weak evidence of abuse when present, but
strong evidence against abuse when absent? Generally, this occurs
when the evidence is common among abused children, and only
slightly less common among nonabused children. Specifically, if the
sum of the proportion of abused children who exhibit the symptom
plus the proportion of nonabused children who exhibit the symptom
is more than 100%, then the presence of the symptom is less probative
for proving abuse than is the absence of the symptom for disproving
abuse.
This analysis highlights the problems associated with developing
profiles of abused children that describe as many abused children as
possible. Profiles that describe a majority of abused children are also
likely to describe a large percentage of nonabused children. In such
situations, evidence of a failure to fit the profile may provide a strong
basis for believing that the child was not abused, whereas evidence of
a match may provide only a weak basis for believing that a child was
abused. 104
The probative asymmetries discussed above are quite common, as
an everyday example demonstrates. For instance, whereas the pres-
ence of a computer in Jim's office is not particularly diagnostic of the
hypothesis that Jim is a scientist, the absence of a computer in Jim's
office is diagnostic of the hypothesis thatJim is not a scientist. From a
102 See supra note 97.
103 See supra Part VII.
104 For example, the Child Sexual Behavior Inventory is a measure of the range and
frequency of a child's sexual behavior. One study which employed statistically derived cut-
off scores reported that the Inventory correctly classified 92% of abused 2-6 year old boys
as abused, and incorrectly classified 38% of nonabused boys as abused. Friedrich et al.,
supra note 54, at 309. Although scores above the cut-off are relevant for proving abuse
(relevance ratio = .92/.38 = 2.4), scores below the cut-off are stronger evidence that the
child was not abused (relevance ratio = .62/.08 = 7.8). As discussed supra note 54, however,
a number of specific behaviors measured by the Inventory are highly probative of abuse.
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relevance ratio perspective, the presence of an office computer is
common to both scientists (e.g., p=.95) and nonscientists (e.g.,
p=.70). Hence, the relevance ratio will be near one. On the other
hand, because the absence of a computer among scientists is an infre-
quent event (e.g., p=.05) relative to the absence of a computer among
nonscientists (e.g., p=.30), the relevance ratio associated with the ab-
sence of a computer is six to one.
D. Implications of Asymmetry for Parties' Discovery Rights
That symptom relevance varies depending upon whether the
symptoms are present or absent has implications for assessing the par-
ties' rights to collect such evidence. For example, defendants some-
times seek the court-ordered examination of an alleged victim on the
ground that such an examination may yield relevant evidence for the
defendant's defense. Prosecutors often resist such a request on the
ground that the alleged victim's privacy rights outweigh the probative
value of whatever evidence such an examination may yield. Judicial
resolution of this tradeoff should depend, in part, on a proper under-
standing of the probative value of the evidence that one may discover.
Thus, in cases where a symptom's presence is more relevant than a
symptom's absence, it would not necessarily be inconsistent for a
judge to require an examination of the victim when requested by the
prosecution, but to deny such a request when made by the defense.' 0 5
Ix
DOES THE PRESENCE OF SYMPTOMS AMONG THE
NONABUSED MAKE THESE SYMPTOMS IRREiEVANT?
We have heretofore emphasized the problems inherent in undue
focus on the numerator of the relevance ratio (i.e., the proportion of
abused children who exhibit a symptom). Thus, one might conclude
that all of the problems with scientific evidence would be solved if
commentators and courts would simply pay more attention to the de-
nominator (i.e., the proportion of nonabused children who exhibit
the symptom). However, overemphasizing the likelihood that
nonabused children will exhibit a symptom is equally possible (i.e.,
focusing too much on the denominator). An undue focus on either
the numerator or denominator misses the importance of assessing the
105 Although the defendant did not raise the issue of a court-ordered examination, the
Indiana Supreme Court has held that a defendant must be allowed to introduce expert
testimony that an alleged victim's behavior is inconsistent with that of a rape victim, Hen-
son v. State, 535 N.E.2d 1189, 1193 (Ind. 1989), reasoning that "this Court has already
recognized the admissibility of rape trauma syndrome evidence .... It would be funda-
mentally unfair to allow the use of such testimony by the State... and then deny its use by
a defendant...." Id.
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relation between the two in determining whether a symptom is rele-
vant for proving that abuse occurred.
Critics of expert testimony frequently argue both that symptoms
of abuse are uncommon and that symptoms occur among nonabused
children, thereby mentioning both numerator and denominator of
the relevance ratio. The critics present these arguments piecemeal,
however, as if each argument alone were sufficient to render symp-
toms irrelevant.10 6 When critics discuss the need for a direct compari-
son between abused and nonabused children, they treat it as a
methodological criticism of the research on sexual abuse, rather than
as the fundamental issue in assessing the relevance of sexual abuse
symptoms. 10 7
Even when the courts do not ignore the denominator, they some-
times exaggerate its importance. In Dunkle, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court asserted that to discriminate between abused and
nonabused children, symptoms must not only "appear regularly in a
group of children with a certain experience, but.., must not appear
in other groups of children who have not had that experience."' 08
The court glossed over the distinction made by the authority it cites,
which argues that the presence of certain symptoms may in fact "in-
crease the likelihood," but not "clearly indicate," that sexual abuse has
106 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dunkle, 602 A.2d 830, 835 n.16 (Pa. 1992) (discussing
the existence of symptoms among nonabused children, but treating statistics regarding
numerator as a sufficient basis for concluding that "these types of percentages cannot con-
stitute probative evidence."); State v. Foret, 628 So. 2d 1116, 1127 (La. 1993) ("Criticisms
include the varying reactions children have to abuse [a numerator problem] and the fact
that behavior often attributed to abuse is sometimes the result of other emotional
problems that do not stem from abuse [a denominator problem]."); Askowitz, supra note
62, at 209 ("These studies have revealed the absence of a single, typical child sexual abuse
victim .... In addition, certain behaviors may seem to indicate some other traumatic
event or behavior of normal children.").
107 See Askowitz, supra note 62, at 209 ("Methodological weaknesses in the existing
studies of child sexual abuse also contribute to the questionable reliability of testimony ....
Without comparison data, it is impossible to conclude that observed effects significantly
differentiate abused from non-abused children.") (emphasis added). State v. Reser, 767
P.2d 1277 (Kan. 1989) is a good example of courts' sometimes limited understanding of
the importance of the comparisons. In Reser, the Kansas Supreme Court acknowledged
that "comparison testing" had not been performed on the behavioral symptoms of sexual
abuse, but, nevertheless, allowed expert testimony on behavioral symptoms. Id at 1282.
The court reasoned that because the expert at trial had "merely testified as to characteris-
tics common to children who had been sexually abused and gave her opinion that the
victim in this case exhibited some of these characteristics," the evidence should be allowed.
Id. The expert had not expressed an ultimate opinion that the child had been abused
based on the existence of common characteristics. Id. What the court in Reser failed to
acknowledge, or perhaps recognize, was that a lack of comparison testing makes it impossi-
ble to determine whether common characteristics increase the likelihood that abuse oc-
curred, let alone to understand whether they justify a conclusion that abuse was likely.
108 Dunkle, 602 A.2d at 832 n.2 (quotingJEF-RraJ. HAUGAARD & N. DiICKON REPPUCCI,
THE SExUAL ABUSE OF CHLiUREN: A CoMPREEusivE GUIDE TO CURRENT KNOWLFDGE AND
INTERvErNTON STRATGIiES 177-78 (1988)).
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
occurred. 0 9 If they occur among a higher percentage of abused chil-
dren, symptoms can occur among some nonabused children and still
be relevant evidence that abuse occurred." 0
Although we are critical of a single-minded focus on the denomi-
nator in assessing the relevance of symptoms, we are sympathetic to
the argument that if a large proportion of nonabused children exhibit
a certain symptom, then the symptom should not be considered rele-
vant unless there is convincing evidence that the symptom is more com-
mon among abused children."' There are several reasons why this is
so. First, if symptoms are common among nonabused children, then
the relevance ratio cannot be terribly high, no matter how common
the symptoms are among abused children. For example, if 50% of
nonabused children exhibit a symptom, then the relevance ratio can-
not be higher than two because no more than 100% of abused chil-
dren will exhibit the symptom. A high denominator thus puts a
serious limit on the possible size of the relevance ratio." 2
Second, a high denominator is unlikely to be the result of "selec-
tion bias." As discussed earlier, "selection bias" occurs when abused
subjects are drawn from a clinical population, inflating the number of
abused children exhibiting a symptom. Sexually abused children are
difficult to identify, if one does not recruit through clinics treating
abused children. On the other hand, nonabused children are rela-
tively easy to locate, making it possible to draw samples representative
of the general population." 3 Therefore, whereas a high numerator in
a study comparing abused and nonabused children might be due to
the source from which the sample of abused children was drawn, a
high denominator is more likely attributable to a high occurrence of
the symptom among nonabused children in general." 4
109 HAUGAARD & REPPUCCI, supra note 108, at 178.
110 If a symptom is rendered irrelevant by the possibility that a nonabused child exhib-
its such a symptom, then a child's sworn testimony that he or she was abused would be
irrelevant, because some nonabused children either lie or falsely believe that they were
abused.
111 Some medical experts have adopted the rule of thumb that if a symptom appears
among more than 10% of nonabused children, the symptom is considered a "normal"
finding. See Adams, supra note 37; Berenson et al., supra note 35.
112 In contrast, note that a low numerator fails to limit the size of the relevance ratio.
Even if only 1% of abused children exhibit a symptom, the relevance ratio could be infi-
nitely high, because as few as 0% of nonabused children might exhibit the symptom.
113 For example, in the Friedrich et al. study, supra note 54, the authors drew the
abused sample from clinics, leading to "selection bias" problems, whereas they drew the
nonabused sample from children visiting their pediatrician for well-child checkups.
114 Although researchers will exclude from the nonabused sample children about
whom suspicions of abuse have arisen, see, e.g., Friedrich et al., supra note 54, some
nonabused children might still exhibit the symptom, because they experienced abuse that
has never been detected. Even if this occurred, however, the percentage of nonabused
children in general who exhibit the symptom should not be large, because (1) most chil-
dren have not been abused, (2) many children who have been abused have been identi-
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Although the most egregious errors in assessing relevance occur
when one focuses exclusively on the numerator of the relevance ratio,
an undue focus on the denominator can be equally misleading. That
some nonabused children exhibit symptoms can lead one to prema-
turely dismiss such symptoms as irrelevant for proving that abuse oc-
curred. Relevance ratio analysis requires that one determine the
proportion of abused children who exhibit a symptom, and compare
this proportion to the proportion of nonabused children who exhibit
the symptom. When the percentage of nonabused children who ex-
hibit the symptom is high, the relevance ratio counsels skepticism; in
such a case, admissibility should be contingent on clear evidence that
a higher proportion of abused children are symptomatic.
CONCLUSION
The relevance ratio is simple, analytically compelling, and easy to
apply. It not only indicates whether proffered evidence is probative,
but also measures how probative the evidence is. When courts ex-
amine expert testimony through the relevance ratio lens, they can
spot errors in reasoning quickly and avert them. The relevance ratio
also facilitates the resolution of problems that, upon first impression,
seem more vexing. These include the relevance of symptoms for re-
buttal purposes and the relative probative value of the presence and
absence of symptoms. In short, use of the relevance ratio by courts
would lead to admissibility decisions that are readily defensible on sci-
entific and logical grounds, and an ability to evaluate the appropriate
weight that should be accorded to certain expert testimony.
Although trial judges in the post-Daubert era must think more like
scientists when evaluating the probative value of evidence, they must
also continue to act like judges and make decisions in accordance
with the Rules of Evidence. Because the relevance ratio builds upon
the legal definition of relevance embodied in Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 401, it promotes both goals. This fusion of science and legal
doctrine is healthy and necessary.
Our focus has been the heuristic value of the relevance ratio for
clarifying and understanding the probative value of expert testimony
in child sexual abuse cases, particularly testimony that invokes the am-
biguous phrase "consistent with" abuse and "common among" abused
fled, and (3) of those who were abused, but who have not been identified, only a fraction
will exhibit the symptoms in question. For example, suppose that 30% of children are
abused before they are 18 and that in 90% of those cases, the abuse is never detected. If
this were the case, then only 1% of the nonabused population would have been sexually
abused in the past year without anyone knowing. If a symptom of abuse, in fact, appears
among 30% of abused children and 1% of nonabused children, then a study of children
believed to be nonabused will find that 1.3% of the nonabused children exhibit the symp-
tom, only slightly underestimating the probativeness of the symptom.
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children. The relevance ratio is also useful for thinking about expert
testimony in other types of cases, particularly those that include foren-
sic science testimony. For example, consider the testimony of ballis-
tics expert William H. Proctor in the Sacco and Vanzetti murder
case.'1 5 Proctor had examined the Colt bullet found in the body of
one of the victims and the Colt automatic found in Sacco's possession.
He testified that the bullet was "consistent with being fired by that
pistol."" 6 Was Proctor's opinion relevant evidence that the bullet did
in fact come from Sacco's gun? One may wish the defense or the
judge had been familiar with the relevance ratio.1 7 Subsequently,
Proctor acknowledged that "[h]ad I been asked the direct question:
whether I had found any affirmative evidence whatever that this so-
called mortal bullet had passed through this particular Sacco's pistol,
I should have answered then, as I do now without hesitation, in the
negative."" 8
115 Commonwealth v. Sacco, 151 N.E. 839 (Mass. 1926).
116 Id. at 862.
117 In his charge to the jury, the judge told the jurors that Proctor had testified that "it
was his [Sacco's] pistol that fired the bullet that caused the death of Beradelli." Id at 863.
118 Id. at 862.
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